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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has engrained the right to privacy in its jurisprudence,
whereby both state constitutions and jurisprudence routinely give hallowed
deference to as an implied right.' For decades, the Supreme Court and the
states left to the individual, married or single, the right to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion in matters fundamentally connected to
a person's decision to bear a child.2
Choosing not to have a child is as intimate as the choice to bear a child.'
1. See United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 402
U.S. 62 (1971) (discussing that Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates that a woman's
liberty and right to privacy extends to family, marriage, and sex and thus includes the
right to remove an unwanted child). But cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-
84 (1965) (holding that the spirit of the First, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments as
applied to the Fourteenth Amendment create a general "right to privacy" and "marital
right to privacy" that may not be unduly intruded upon by a state and the United States
governments).
2. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (arguing that the decision to
bear a child, made between married or unmarried persons, shall not be subject to
unwarranted governmental intrusion); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (establishing the fundamental right to procreate and prohibiting the government
from enforcing procedures that infringe on the right).
3. See e.g. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454 (quoting Justice Jackson's concurrence from
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The decisions handed down in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey established that a pregnant woman's option to terminate the pregnancy
is a private liberty.4 States act either as champions for the right to access
abortion services or as roadblocks by restricting a woman's ability to access
abortion procedures.'
In recent years, several states introduced and passed abortion legislation
prohibiting certain procedures prior to the detection of a fetal heartbeat.6
Detection of a fetal heartbeat can occur as early as six weeks into pregnancy,
often before a woman is aware of her pregnancy. A detectable fetal
heartbeat became the new "viability" standard-but the word "viability" is a
misnomer. Viability means a child is reasonably likely to survive upon birth.'
Fifty percent of fetuses survive after being born twenty-three to twenty-four
weeks post-gestation.9
Reasonable access to abortion services in states like Georgia dwindled
prior to the passage of this legislation.'o Since 2014, only fourteen clinics in
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (arguing that
arbitrary governmental action occurs when officials target legislation at a population on
a discretionary basis).
4. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy
broadly encompasses a woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy).
Although this comment refers to 'women' as those individuals who have abortion
procedures, this author acknowledges that not every person that has a uterus can get
pregnant and wishes to have an abortion identifies as a woman.
5. See Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016)
(highlighting that admitting privilege requirements imposed on abortion clinics in Texas
makes it unduly difficult for operation of the clinics to persist).
6. See K.K. Rebecca Lai, Abortion Bans: 9 States Have Passed Bills to Limit the
Procedure This Year, N.Y. TIMEs (May 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2019/us/abortion-laws-states.html (documenting states that have proposed heartbeat
abortion bills, states whose courts have blocked such bills, and the current political
landscape that makes these bills amenable).
7. See Jordan Dahme, Heartbeat Bans and Gonzales: How the Door was Opened
for a New Era of Anti-Abortion Legislation, 25 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REv. 51, 52
(2016) (exploring how the Gonzales decision gave proponents of heartbeat abortion bans
three ways to justify restrictive abortion legislation).
8. See Roe, 401 U.S. at 160-62 (defining "viability" as the fetus's potential ability
to live outside the womb occurring about twenty-four weeks into pregnancy).
9. See Gene Emery, Survival rates for extremely preterm babies improving in U.S.,
REUTERS: HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 15, 2017, 5:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
health-preemies-survival-impairments/survival-rates-for-extremely-preterm-babies-
improving-in-u-s-idUSKBN15U2SA (analyzing statistics that demonstrate the average
length of time fetuses can survive outside the womb).
10. See State Facts about Abortion: Georgia, GUTTMACHER INST. (May 2018),
https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/state-facts-about-abortion-georgia (showing
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Georgia provided abortions, while ninety-six percent of Georgia counties
have no abortion clinics, leaving fifty-eight percent of women in the state
without access to a clinic." In Georgia, women of varying ethnicities, ages,
and education levels receive abortions annually.1 2 Passing the Living Infants
Fairness and Equality Act ("the LIFE Act") in Georgia imposes more
intrusive regulations on women that will substantially diminish their state
constitutional guaranteed right to privacy.13
This Comment argues that the LIFE Act is unconstitutional as a violation
of Georgia's already rigid state right to privacy. 14 Part I evaluates Georgia's
tradition of upholding and applying its state right to privacy in different
facets of life, namely family and intimate life.'" Part I also examines the
LIFE Act, its provisions, restrictions, and legislative history.' 6 Further, Part
I explores a similar fetal heartbeat statute in Iowa that courts blocked, relying
on the state's right to privacy framework."
Part II demonstrates how the LIFE Act is unconstitutional by applying
tests and considerations from past Georgia cases, finding the right to privacy
in the protection of the family and intimate life matters, and examining the
act's intrusive abortion regulations.' 8 Part II further asserts that in states
where similar fetal heartbeat bills failed due to deference to privacy rights,
where women obtain abortions, pregnancies and their outcomes, and current restrictions
on abortion in Georgia).
11. See id. (demonstrating that many women live in areas that remain without access
to an abortion clinic or provider).
12. See generally id. (illustrating populations that received abortions in 2014:
twenty-nine percent white, twenty-eight percent black, twenty-five percent Hispanic, and
nine percent of other racial and ethnic groups).
13. See The LIFE Act, H.B. 481, 154th Leg., at 4 (Ga. 2019) (prohibiting abortions
when there is embryonic or fetal cardiac activity and mandating that a mother and fetus
should be treated as separate patients during doctor's exams because a fetus is considered
a natural living person).
14. See GA. CONST. OF 1983, art. I, § I, Para. I. (establishing that it is unconstitutional
to violate an individual's liberty without due process); see also Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 194 (1905) (holding that the Georgia constitution provides
all of the state's citizens with the right to privacy).
15. See infra Part I (exploring Georgia's jurisprudence surrounding the right to
privacy in matters of family and intimate life).
16. See infra Part I (discussing the contents of the LIFE Act, its implications,
provisions, and legislative history).
17. See infra Part I (examining why Kentucky courts blocked 'a fetal heartbeat bill
in the context of the state's history upholding privacy rights).
18. See infra Part II (demonstrating that courts in Georgia should find the LIFE Act
unconstitutional on the basis of case precedent).
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Georgia courts can use state constitutional arguments to invalidate the LIFE
Act. 9 Part III demonstrates that the policy surrounding abortion going
forward in Georgia may lead to an omnibus abortion ban.20 Part III also
recommends that Georgia provide women and children with better access to
health and educational services, in addition to improving its foster care
system, if state courts find the LIFE Act is constitutional. 2 1 Lastly, this
article concludes by reiterating that the Georgia LIFE Act violates its state
constitutional right to privacy and is thus unconstitutional as it stands.2 2
I. BACKGROUND
A. Georgia's Steadfast Tradition to Upholding the Right to Privacy
At the turn of the twentieth century, an appellate court in Georgia first
recognized the right to privacy in the United States.2 3 The Supreme Court of
Georgia concluded in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. that the
Georgia state constitution guarantees privacy liberties, with some
limitations.24 The First Amendment places limitations on the right to privacy
when it interferes with expressions concerning a matter of legitimate public
interest.25 The Court considers several factors when invoking the right to
privacy, such as authority to display another's likeness, waiver of privacy,
19. See infra Part II (arguing that Georgia should evaluate the LIFE Act by looking
to a state with a similar tradition of privacy law jurisprudence, where a similar bill was
struck down).
20. See infra Part III (discussing the dangers of failing to apply privacy lawjurisprudence to abortion and how it could lead to further abortion restrictions).
21. See infra Part III (exploring opportunities for Georgia to improve services for
women and children if the LIFE Act is found to be constitutional).
22. See infra Part IV (concluding that the LIFE Act violates Georgia's strong
adherence to the right to privacy and should be found unconstitutional).
23. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 194 (1905) (stating that
the right to privacy buttresses from natural law and that some matters are private while
others public); see also Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 100 S.E.2d 881, 882
(Ga. 1957) (asserting that the first recognition of the right to privacy in the United States
was from the Georgia Supreme Court).
24. See Pavesich, 122 Ga. at 219-20 (concluding that the right to privacy is
guaranteed to Georgia citizens and prohibits publication of someone's personal form,
likeness, or private information); see also Ambles v. State, 383 S.E.2d 555, 557-58 (Ga.
1989) (stating that the right to privacy is fundamental).
25. See Pavesich, 122 Ga. at 204 (explaining that speech rights outweigh privacy
rights when a conflict arises over the publication of a matter affecting the public interest);
see also Cox v. Brazo, 303 S.E.2d 71, 73-74 (Ga. 1983) (precluding an individual from
asserting a privacy interest in information that they publicize prior to a separate
disclosure of the information).
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status as a public figure, and the commercial nature of the speech.26 The
right to privacy in Georgia extends beyond publications into the intimate
areas of an individual's life.27
The right to privacy includes the right to possess intimate material in one's
home. 2 8 In the landmark Supreme Court case Stanley v. Georgia, police
arrested a man after investigators found that he was in possession of film that
depicted obscene images of sexual intercourse and nudity.29 The Court held
that, notwithstanding Georgia's legitimate interests, the state exceeded its
authority by prohibiting an individual from viewing obscene or intimate
material in the privacy of their home." To disallow the possession of and
the ability to view obscene material in the privacy of an individual's home
violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and thus, denies that
individual their right to privacy.3 1
The right to privacy enables an individual to be free from unnecessary
public scrutiny when certain expressions do not implicate public interest.32
The Georgia Supreme Court did not examine legislation regulating the right
to privacy, as it relates to consensual sexual encounters in one's home, until
Powell v. State in 1998.33 Individuals are protected from government
26. See Pavesich, 122 Ga. at 217-18 (denoting the list of possible exceptions with
respect to privacy rights).
27. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (holding an individual may
possess lewd material in the privacy of his or her own home); see also Powell v. State
510 S.E.2d 18, 24 (Ga. 1998) (holding that a statute that prohibits private, consensual,
and noncommercial sodomy violates Georgia's fundamental right to privacy).
28. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566-67 (averring that the state does not have a legitimate
interest to control an individual's undesirable thoughts and consumption of obscene
material).
29. See id. at 559-60 (examining whether an individual is criminally liable for mere
possession of obscene materials).
30. See id. at 565-66 (explaining that Georgia does not have the authority to regulate
the thoughts of its citizens or the materials he or she wishes to view) (emphasis added).
31. See id. at 567-68 (opining that the government may not place a restriction on
what an individual thooses to consume because an individual's right to read or observe
what he pleases is fundamental to the scheme of ordered individual liberty).
32. See Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 254 S.E.2d 146, 149 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979)
(holding that publication of privileged information between an employee and employer
violates the ability to be free from any wrongful intrusion into an individual's private
life). But see Hines v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 223 S.E.2d 468, 469 (Ga. Ct. App.
1976) (holding that a singular letter inquiry into the business information of a citizen by
a bank conducting due diligence is not an invasion of privacy).
33. See Powell v. State 510 S.E.2d 18, 30 (Ga. 1998) (examining whether the right
to privacy precludes legislation that prohibits sodomy without force in a private home
between two parties legally capable of consenting to the sexual act).
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intrusion when they exercise their right to personal liberty by consenting and
withdrawing from public view to engage in private sexual acts.34 But where
there is a legitimate state interest, the Court may limit the right to privacy as
it pertains to sexual activity." When an act is void of any public benefit and
unduly oppresses an individual's right to privacy however, it oversteps the
bounds of permissible state police power and is unconstitutional in
Georgia. 6
Under Georgia's conception of privacy rights, medical examinations and
records are highly protected.37 Georgia prohibits the publication of a
person's medical history, conditions, and records unless there is a waiver
authorizing the release of that information.38  Disclosure of a medical
condition, particularly one like AIDs, to one's family and friends abrogates
privacy protections. 39 Further, even if a health provider owns and possesses
a patient's medical records, Georgia prohibits the distribution of those
records without the patient's consent. 4 0 A third party's disclosure of medical
34. See id. at 24 (holding that legislation prohibiting sodomy has no public benefit
and that consensual sex in private is an activity that fundamentally deserves privacy
protections); see also In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441, 442-43 (Ga. 2003) (holding that sexual
intercourse between two consenting sixteen-year-olds did not violate Georgia's
fornication statute because the right to privacy protects legally consensual, private sex
from criminalization).
35. See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 24 (listing sexual acts that are unprotected by the right
to privacy: sex in a public place, sex where one party is incapable of consent, sexual
assault, rape, and prostitution).
36. See id at 26 (holding that criminalization of consensual sodomy impinges upon
the guaranteed right to privacy because it serves no legitimate government purpose). But
see Morrison v. State, 526 S.E.2d 336, 338 (Ga. 2000) (holding that public commerce in
sex, even in private, is not afforded the right to privacy).
37, See King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 494 (Ga. 2000) (exploring whether medical
records needed for prosecution are protected by the right to privacy); see also Multimedia
Wmaz v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 495 (Ga. App. Ct. 1994) (affirming the award of
damages to a man with AIDs who agreed to appear anonymously on a television program
to discuss his experience with AIDs and was not given anonymity).
38. See Multimedia Wmaz, 443 S.E.2d at 494 (holding that a person may choose to
broadcast their medical records anonymously and still be guaranteed privacy protections
after the anonymity promised is violated).
39. See id. (explaining that disclosure of AIDs to one's family members, friends,
support groups, and medical personnel does not constitute waiver because those
recipients understand the information is intended to be kept private).
40. See King, 535 S.E.2d at 495 (holding that information contained in medical
records reflect the current state of a person's body and is thus protected from exhibition
without his or her consent); see also Thurman v. State, 861 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. App.
1993) (holding that medical records should be given more privacy protection than phone
or bank records).
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records is only valid if Georgia law requires the production of those records,
and the patient is on notice of the authorized disclosure.4 1
Georgia courts similarly afford privacy protections to family life matters.42
In Brooks v. Parkerson, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a "Grandparent
Visitation Statute" was unconstitutional because it authorized courts to allow
child visitation by grandparents over the objection of fit parents.43 The court
found that the law violated the private realm of family units and parents'
ability to establish a home, raise children, and parent freely." The Court
acknowledged that the right to privacy enables parents to control their
children without undue governmental intrusion.4 5
B. The LIFE ACT: Provisions, Restrictions, and Legislative History.
On May 7, 2019, the Governor of Georgia, Brian Kemp, signed the Living
Infant Fairness and Equality Act ("LIFE Act") into law.46 Seeking to reflect
the policy that Georgia recognizes unborn children as natural persons,
lawmakers drafted the bill to amend previous abortion legislation.4 7 The
41. See King, 535 S.E.2d at 495 (holding that the state is justified in invading a
citizen's privacy to obtain medical records when it reflects state interest and is narrowly
tailored to that interest).
42. See Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ga. 1995) (holding that O.C.G.A.
§ 19-7-3 is unconstitutional because it invaded the private, protected interest of the
family unit).
43. See id. at 771-72 (acknowledging the long-established tradition that parents
should be able to raise their children without undue state interference); see also Hunter
v. Carter, 485 S.E.2d 827, 830 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (averring that factfinders and
legislators must ultimately prioritize the interests of parents when issues arise regarding
grandparent visitations).
44. See Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 772 (underscoring that the Georgia constitution's
privacy protection insulates the family unit and its decisions).
45. See e.g. id. (recognizing that parents have the right to parent their children
privately, without undue governmental interference); see also Borgers v. Borgers, 820
S.E.2d 474, 480 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (noting the Georgia constitution protects parent's
right to familial relations with his or her children); see e.g. Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp.,
155 S.E. 194, 197 (Ga. 1930) (holding it violates the right to privacy to use a child's
likeness without the parent's permission).
46. See Vanessa Romo, Georgia's Governor Signs 'Fetal Heartbeat'Abortion Law,
NPR: LAW (May 7, 2019, 11:41 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/07/7 2 102 83 2 9 /
georgias-governor-signs-fetal-heartbeat-law (detailing the signing-into-law ceremony
where the governor gave an impassioned speech about the bill and how Georgia respects
life at all stages).
47. See LIFE Act, H.B. 481, 154th Leg. (2019) (demonstrating the changes made in
the Official Georgia Code to reflect that an unborn child is considered a natural person
if it has a detectable heartbeat).
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LIFE Act further makes any natural person, including that of an unborn child
with a detectable heartbeat, part of the official Georgia population.48 The
Act defined a detectable human heartbeat as embryonic or fetal cardiac
activity or the steady rhythmic contraction of the heart within the womb.49
The LIFE Act provides three exceptions for abortion when the fetus
heartbeat is detectable.5 0 First, the physician may perform an abortion upon
determination that a medical emergency to the mother exists." Second, the
physician may perform an abortion if the gestational age of the fetus is
twenty weeks or less when the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest. 5 2 To
fall within the rape or incest exception however, the mother must file an
official police report alleging rape or incest before undergoing an abortion."
Third, abortion is legal if the physician determines that the pregnancy is
medically futile.54
Under section four of the LIFE Act, the physician must render medical aid
during an abortion if the fetus is capable of sustaining life. Additionally,
officials must make the mother's health records available to the district
attorney in the jurisdiction where the abortion procedure occurs or where the
woman resides.56
Finally, any violation made under section four of the LIFE Act is
punishable by imprisonment of one to ten years. 57 Any violation could result
48. See id. (granting an unborn fetus with the same rights as any other natural person
in Georgia).
49. See id (setting forth the requirement that an abortion is prohibited when a
physician detects a fetal heartbeat).
50. See id. (stating three narrow exceptions when an abortion is permitted under the
LIFE Act).
51. See id (explaining the medical emergency exception, although neither the bill or
statute define what is considered a medical emergency).
52. See id. (stipulating the physical and gestational age of a fetus that may be aborted
in cases of rape or incest).
53. See id. (permitting abortion in cases of rape or incest so long as it is documented
in an official police report).
54. See id. (defining "medically futile" as an unborn child who has a profound and
irremediable congenital or chromosomal anomaly rendering the child incapable of
sustaining life after birth).
55. See id. (stating that a physician or clinician performing an abortion must render
available medical assistance under circumstances when life may be sustained by the fetus
outside of the womb).
56. See id (requiring that medical records are made available to government
officials).
57. See Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-140(a)-(b) (2019) (detailing that a prison sentence is
appropriate when a person uses any medicine, drug, or instrument on a woman with the
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in the revocation of the physician's license or to penalties. While section
four makes affirmative defenses available to both the women and physicians
involved in the abortion, the party asserting the defense has the burden of
proving the affirmative defense elements to a jury.59
C. The Right to Privacy and Other Fundamental Rights Blocking a Fetal
Heartbeat Bill in Iowa
Georgia is one of many states that proposed and passed a fetal heartbeat
abortion statute.6 o Like other legal challenges against the LIFE Act in
Georgia, pro-choice groups in Mississippi, Iowa, and Tennessee challenged
their state's respective abortion legislation in both federal and state court.61
Iowa governor, Kim Reynolds, signed Senate File 359 into law on May 4,
2018, prohibiting abortions after the detection of a fetal heartbeat.62 Iowa
previously only allowed the performance of abortions before twenty-weeks
into the gestational period- Senate File 359 further restricted abortions to a
period before most women are aware of their pregnancy.6 3 Shortly after Iowa
enacted Senate File 359, Planned Parenthood of the Heartland ("PPH") and
other parties filed a lawsuit against Governor Reynolds challenging the state
constitutionality of Senate File 359.64
intent to produce a miscarriage or abortion).
58. See id § 43-34-8(a)(7) (2019) (granting authority to the Georgia Composite
Medical Board to discipline any physician engaged in unprofessional, unethical, or
deleterious conduct); see also id. § 43-34-8(b)(1)(F)(including penalties for physicians
that may include license revocation).
59. See Complaint at 27, SisterSong v. Kemp, (N.D. Ga. 2019) (No. 1:19-mi-99999-
UNA) (highlighting that few affirmative defenses are available to women and
physicians).
60. See Patricia Mazzei & Alan Blinder, Georgia Governor Signs 'Fetal Heartbeat'
Abortion Law, N.Y. TnvEs (May 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/
us/heartbeat-bill-georgia.html (listing Iowa and other states as those that have proposed
fetal heartbeat statutes akin to the LIFE Act).
61. See Complaint at 27, SisterSong (challenging the constitutionality of the LIFE
Act using federal law and jurisprudence); Mazzei & Blinder, supra note 60 (reporting
several constitutional challenges in federal court against states with bills like the LIFE
Act).
62. See Sasha Ingber, Iowa Bans Most Abortions as Governor Signs 'Heartbeat'Bill,
NPR (May 5, 2018, 11:22 A.M.), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/201 8 /
05/05/608738116/iowa-bans-most-abortions-as-governor-signs-heartbeat-bill (reporting
that the Iowan fetal heartbeat abortion bill was the first of its kind as it prohibits all
abortion after six weeks with few exceptions).
63. See id. (detailing contrasting procedure deadlines between Iowa's prior abortion
law and the new law).
64. See Women's Rights Groups File Lawsuit to Strike Down Iowa's
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In 2018, Iowa State Judge Michael Huppert found the Iowa fetal heartbeat
bill unconstitutional under the Iowa State Constitution. Chief Justice
Huppert relied on the people of Iowa's right to privacy, finding that the right
is central to making personal decisions about a person's bodily integrity and
family composition.66 Further, the court emphasized that Iowa has a
steadfast tradition in protecting profoundly personal decisions like that of
starting a family, parenting, and child rearing.67 Ultimately, the court held
that Iowa's jurisprudence and constitutional tradition support the right to
have autonomy and dominion over one's own body, and thus, ruled the fetal
heartbeat bill unconstitutional. 8
II. ANALYSIS
A. Georgia Courts Must Observe Its Right to Privacy Deference to
Evaluate the State Constitutionality of the LIFE Act because it Has
Continually Afforded Right to Privacy Deference to Intimate Matters that
are Akin to Abortion.
1. Georgia Courts Routinely Apply the Right to Privacy to Intimate Life
Matters and Therefore the LIFE Act Must Receive the Same Right to
Privacy Treatment Because Abortion is an Intimate Life Matter.
Georgia courts routinely give deference to the right to privacy as it pertains
to matters of the body such as consensual sexual intercourse. 6 9 The Court
Unconstitutional New Abortion Law, PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF
THE HEARTLAND (May 15, 2018), littps://www.plannedparenthood.org/planned-
parenthood-heartland/newsroom/womens-rights-groups-file-lawsuit-to-strike-down-
iowas-unconstitutional-new-abortion-law (announcing that the ACLU, PPH, and several
doctors challenged Iowa's heartbeat bill).
65. See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Reynolds, 915 N.W.2d 206, 213
(Iowa 2018) (highlighting that it is the obligation of the Iowa Supreme Court to ensure
that no law intrudes upon an interest protected by the Iowa constitution).
66. See id. at 234 (positing there is a nexus betwoon the fundamcntal right to privacy
and the right to make private personal decisions, such as having a child).
67. See id. at 237 (likening the right to make personal life decisions to a fundamental
right that should not be intruded upon warrantlessly by the state).
68. See id (announcing that Iowa's constitution implicitly guarantees the right to
make private personal decisions based upon one's own needs, and thus, the ability to
access an abortion shall not be infringed upon by the state).
69. See In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441, 442 (Ga. 2003) (defining consensual sexual
intercourse as unforced sex between individuals who are legally capable of consenting);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (averring the First Amendment allows for
a citizen to consume any material in the privacy of their home); Powell v. State, 510
S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998) (holding that the government may not prohibit sodomy so long
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averred that the right to privacy guaranteed in the Georgia Constitution is
more extensive than the right granted in the Constitution of the United
States. 7 0 The Supreme Court of the United States endows each individual in
Georgia with the right to satisfy his or her own emotional or physical needs
within the privacy of their home without undue governmental interference.
The Supreme Court protects from governmental intrusion, per Georgia
constitutional law, that merely possessing and consuming obscene materials
in the privacy of one's home is not a punishable offense.72 So long as
individuals view or consume obscene material in private, then the
government may not intrude.7 3 Similarly, pregnant women who want to
obtain an abortion may make the decision to have an abortion in private,
away from public scrutiny.74 Additionally, pregnant women may obtain an
abortion conducted in the privacy of a doctor's office, outside the view of
public scrutiny.75 Applying the ruling from Stanley, if a woman's decision
to obtain an abortion and the procedure itself are both conducted in private,
whether the fetus is six-weeks-old or twenty-weeks-old is irrelevant.7 6 Given
that physicians perform abortions in a private office or clinic outside of
public view, Stanley's holding controls.
as it is done in private and is consensual); In re JM, 575 S.E.2d at 441-42 (stating that
sexual intercourse between two consenting people in private is not a violation of the
fornication statute).
70. See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 21-22 (describing how the right to privacy originated
in Georgia Courts and the state's robust jurisprudence surrounding the right to privacy).
71. See generally Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565-66 (confirming that the state may not
control the content of a persons' thoughts or the contents of her library).
72. See id. at 566 (acknowledging that the state cannot punish or control an
individual based upon their private thoughts).
73. Compare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492-94 (1957) (declaring that the
First Amendment does not protect those who violate an obscenity statute by publicly
distributing obscene materials to unwilling viewers), with Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564
(identifying that the possession of obscene material does not violate an obscenity statute
if it was viewed and consumed privately in the home).
74. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (concluding that the right to personal
privacy extends to a woman's decision to have an abortion, but this right is not
unlimited).
75. See e.g. Brown v. Ginnett Emergency Specialists, P.C., No. 10EV010234Y,
2010 Ga. State LEXIS 341, at *15 (Sept. 7,2010) (concluding that medical privacy rights
are in place to protect the patient from unwanted outside scrutiny).
76. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 567 (stating that private consumption of obscene
material will not extend to the public).
77. Cf Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecology, 476 U.S.
747, 762 (1986) (stating that doctors' appointments performing an abortion procedure
are protected by privacy and confidentiality).
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Applying In re J.M and Powell v. State to the LIFE Act and Georgia's
right to privacy with respect to sexual acts and encounters, the legislation's
enaction is unconstitutional." Georgia enshrouds with privacy protection the
act of consensual sex, if unforced in a private space between those who are
legally capable of consenting. 79 Sexual intercourse is naturally one of the
most intimate and private activities-this private affair must be free from
government intrusion because it is of no legitimate concern to the public."
There is no compelling state interest to prevent sexual intercourse in
private." The law protects private sexual intercourse that results in
pregnancy, planned or otherwise, from governmental intrusion as there is no
legitimate interest to intrude on family planning. 82
When a woman becomes pregnant, she often does not know that she is
pregnant until well after the gestational age the LIFE Act defines.83 Privacy
rights protect the private decision that the woman and her partner make to
keep the child, as it was the act of private sexual intercourse that led to the
pregnancy.84 However, the LIFE Act removes from Georgia's citizens the
private decision to obtain an abortion post-heartbeat detection.85  The
Georgia Court in In re JIM alluded to the state having a compelling interest
78. See In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441, 444 (Ga. 2003) (holding that there is an
insufficient state interest to regulate private, unforced sexual conduct of persons who can
legally consent that may overcome the right to privacy); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18,
24 (Ga. 1998) (adjudicating that sexual encounters in private between legally consenting
people is embraced by the right to personal liberty and is thus free from governmental
interference).
79. See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 24 (ascertaining that there is no other activity more
reasonably deserving of privacy than sexual activity).
80. Cf In reJM, 575 S.E.2d at 442-43 (stating that right to privacy protects sexual
activities and should allow individuals to be let alone to participate in those activities).
81. See id. at 444 (espousing that there is an insufficient government interest in
regulating private, sexual conduct).
82. See Eisendstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (stating that if the right to privacy is
to mean anything it is to disallow the government from intruding on a married or
unmarried couples' decision to bear and beget a child).
83. See LIFE Act, H.B. 481, 154th Leg. (Ga. 2019); Jordan Dahme, Heartbeat Bans
and Gonzales: How the Door was Opened for a New Era ofAnti-Abortion Legislation,
25 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTs. L. REv. 51, 58 (2016) (noting that the detection of a fetal
heartbeat may occur as early as six weeks into gestation, often before a woman knows
that she is pregnant).
84. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 313 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that the right to
procreate is a fundamental right afforded to all individuals); see also Powell, 510 S.E.2d
at 24 (protecting the right to have sex privately without governmental regulation).
85. See Ga. H.B. 481 (prohibiting any abortion procedure to be performed post fetal
heartbeat detection with three strict exceptions).
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in shielding the public from the intimacies of others by intruding upon
consensual sexual acts.8 However, the state may not exercise control over
these intimate acts and decisions, whether sexual or involving an abortion,
that are inherently private and personal.87
The LIFE Act's mandate that a woman may not receive an abortion in the
case of incest or rape, unless she files an official police report, also violates
the right to privacy.88 Georgia courts routinely recognize that sexual acts are
a private matter, thus protecting these acts from unwarranted governmental
interference.8 9  Rape and incest are both acts of sexual violence and
intimately affect the physical, emotional and mental state of survivors.90
Georgia consistently grants its citizens the right to be let alone to make their
own decisions without intrusion from the state, including the right to disclose
rape or incest.91 The LIFE Act provision denies women the right to choose
not to disclose their rape or incest.92 If a woman decides not to disclose her
rape or incest to law enforcement-for a myriad of reasons-she must follow
86. See In re J.M, 575 S.E.2d at 444 (finding that shielding the public from the
intimacies of others is irrelevant if these intimacies are conducted in private).
87. See id. (reiterating that privacy protects lawful, consensual sexual activities that
take place in private).
88. See GA. H.B. 481 (mandating that if the gestational age of an unborn fetus is
twenty weeks or less and the pregnancy is a result of rape or incest then an abortion is
permissible past heartbeat detection if the mother filed an official police report alleging
the rape or incest).
89. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 24 (Ga. 1998) (holding that private sodomy
and other sexual activities between those who consent are protected by right to privacy
and are free from unwarranted governmental intrusion); In re JM, 575 S.E.2d at 442-43
(underscoring that right to privacy protects private intimate activities and are free from
the unwanted scrutiny by the government and the public); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 565 (1969) (confirming that the state may not control the contents of a person's
private thoughts and experiences); Cf Ambles v. State, 383 S.E.2d 555, 557-58 (Ga.
1989) (identifying that privacy is a fundamental right).
90. See Complaint at 27, SisterSong v. Kemp, (N.D. Ga. 2019) (No. 1:19-mi-99999-
UNA) (enumerating that many survivors of rape or incest are unable to file a police report
for fear of violent retaliation); see also Currington v. State, 606 S.E.2d 619, 622 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2004) (showcasing evidence that a survivor of rape may suffer emotional and
mental pain as a result of his or her rape). See generally Doe v. Bd. Of Regents of the
Univ. Sys. of Ga., 452 S.E.2d 776, 781 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that the purpose
of the confidentiality statute for rape survivors is to help victims cope with their trauma
and encourage rape reporting).
91. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70-71 (Ga. 1905)
(advocating that the right to privacy exists and a Georgia citizen in his or her home is
entitled to protection against unwanted scrutiny by either the public or government).
92. See id.
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through with the pregnancy. After Pavesich, the seminal right to privacy
case, Georgia regularly endows its citizens with the ability to keep their own
personal information private; the LIFE Act provision denies women this
right by requiring disclosure of rape or incest in order to obtain an abortion
procedure post-heartbeat detection. 94  Georgia has continually given
deferential right to privacy treatment to consensual private sexual acts. 95
However, Georgia courts do not apply the same right to privacy deference to
the private decisions and acts that would allow for a woman to terminate her
pregnancy.96 There is a right to privacy nexus between the private act that
creates a pregnancy and that which terminates the pregnancy.9 7 Applying
the right to privacy tests from the relevant jurisprudence to the provisions in
the LIFE Act shows that the act violates the Georgia Constitution on its face
and is thus invalid.98
93. See Ga. H.B. 481 (stating the need for an official police report); see also
Complaint at 27 (explaining many women are unable to file a police report within the
timeframe set out by the LIFE Act and for fear of reliving the trauma by or possible
retribution by their rapist).
94. See Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 78 (maintaining that the right to be let alone derives
from exercising the personal right to use one's property as one wishes and is afforded
protection from unwanted scrutiny from the public).
95. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 23-24 (holding that legislation that prohibits
a specific sexual act does not provide for any public benefit and that private, consensual
sexual activity is highly deserving of the right to privacy protection); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1969) (declaring that Georgia does not have a legitimate interest
in monitoring less than desirable thoughts and the consumption obscene materials if they
are used by an individual in private); In re JM, 575 S.E.2d at 442-443 (Ga. 2003)
(averring that the state does not have a legitimate interest in criminalizing private,
consensual sex per the implied right to privacy in the Georgia Constitution). ,
96. See Ga. H.B. 481 (prohibiting any woman to obtain an abortion after a fetal
heartbeat is detectable and granting citizenship rights to an unborn fetus).
97. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 488 (1972) (identifying that the decision
of whether to have a child is not to be subject to government interference as this decision
is protected by the right to privacy).
98. Compare Ga. H.B. 481 (criminalizing abortion after cardiac activity is detected
in a fetus except in three narrow circumstances where post-fetal heartbeat abortion is
permissible), with In re J.M, 575 S.E.2d at 442-43 (asserting that Georgia legislation
may not criminalize private, consensual sexual acts between those who are legally able
to consent to those acts); compare Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 24 (finding that consensual
sexual activity is most deserving to be given right to privacy protection from unwarranted
governmental intrusion and regulation), with Ga. H.B. 481 (prohibiting women from
having an abortion procedure after a fetal heartbeat is detected unless in the case of rape,
incest, or medical emergency).
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2. Georgia Courts Routinely Apply the Right to Privacy to Medical
Records and Therefore the LIFE Act Must Receive the Same Right to
Privacy Treatment Because the LIFE Act Implicates the Release of Medical
Records.
Georgia courts have regularly afforded right to privacy protections as they
relate to the distribution and publication of medical records to third parties.99
The LIFE Act provision requiring the reporting of medical records and the
current location of a woman who receives an abortion to either the district
attorney of where the abortion is performed, or where the woman receiving
the procedure resides, directly violates the privacy protection afforded to
Georgia citizens with respect to medical records.o10 The right to privacy,
alongside the Georgia constitution, protects any medical records containing
past and current procedures, conditions, and general health data from
unnecessary distribution to third parties.10 1
Applying the reasoning the Georgia Court used in King v. -State, the LIFE
Act provision forcing women to report the abortion procedure to the relevant
district attorney violates Georgia's fundamental right to privacy. 10 2 Because
Georgia recognizes a broader interpretation of the right to privacy than the
United States Constitution, the right to privacy encompasses personal health
records.1 0 3 The LIFE Act requires disclosure of a woman's health records to
the appropriate district attorney, even when a physician performs an abortion
99. See King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 495 (Ga. 2000) (maintaining that a patient has
a reasonable expectation that the private data pertaining to the state her body is to remain
private and may not be disclosed to a third party without a patient's consent); Multimedia
Wmaz v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 493-94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasizing that privacy
is not waived when a person discloses her medical conditions to family and friends).
100. See Ga. H.B. 481 (providing that a woman may have access to an abortion if the
pregnancy was a result of rape or incest if the medical records are made available to
public officials); King, 535 S.E.2d at 495 (averring that the distribution of a person's
private medical records may not be distributed unless there is a pending criminal action
against that person requiring the disclosure of those records).
101. See King, 535 S.E.2d at 496 (holding that the constitutional right to privacy
prohibits any initial unauthorized disclosure of medical records to anyone).
102. Compare King, 535 S.E.2d at 495 (applying the right to privacy to medical
records so long as they are not needed per another Georgia law, specifically where there
is a compelling interest), with Ga. H.B. 481 (requiring that an abortion procedure
performed in the case of incest or rape be reported to the district attorney without a
compelling need on part of the state to have this information).
103. See King, 535 S.E.2d at 495 (reiterating that the right to privacy in Georgia is
more extensive than granted by the U.S. Constitution and as such, that right extends to
medical records).
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before detecting a heartbeat, thus violating Georgia's privacy protection of
health records from third party disclosure. 104
Upon application of the right to privacy tests from publication of medical
records jurisprudence to the provisions from the LIFE Act, the act violates
the Georgia Constitution on its face and is thus invalid.'
3. Georgia Courts Routinely Apply the Right to Privacy to Family Life
Matters and Therefore the LIFE Act Must Receive the Same Right to
Privacy Treatment Because the LIFE Act Implicates Family Life and
Decision-Making.
Georgia courts consistently apply the right to privacy in matters
concerning family life, including: parental decision-making and visitation
rights of extended family.'0o The LIFE Act prohibits a woman from deciding
whether or not to start a family. 10 7 Georgia courts have denounced state
interference with the parental right to familial relations. 0 8 The LIFE Act
infringes upon a potential parents' right to privacy of raising a child in a way
she sees fit.'0 9
Georgia courts have invalidated statutes that blatantly curtail a parent's
104. See Ga. H.B. 481 (requiring for automatic disclosure of health records regardless
of whether the abortion is performed within the viability period); see e.g. King, 535
S.E.2d at 496 (explaining that state interference with the right to privacy must avoid
subjecting Georgia citizens to undue oppressiveness).
105. Compare King, 535 S.E.2d at 495 (emphasizing that right to privacy deference
extends to the unwarranted distributioi of medical records), with Ga. H.B. 481
(mandating an automatic disclosure of complete medical records of a woman obtaining
an abortion procedure to the local district attorney regardless of whether the abortion was
performed before fetus heartbeat detection).
106. See Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 771 (Ga. 1995) (concluding that
parents have a constitutional interest to raise their children without undue state
interference); Borgers v. Borgers, 820 S.E.2d 474,480 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (opining that
a parent's natural right to familial relations is protected under the right to privacy); see
also In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984) (recognizing that there is a
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in making decisions for the child).
107. See Ga. H.B. 481 (denying an abortion procedure to be performed after cardiac
activity of the fetus is detected).
108. See Borgers, 820 S.E.2d at 480 (recognizing that Georgia courts have repeatedly
safeguarded a parent's right to raise his or her child in a manner of their choosing).
109. See Ga. H.B. 481 (providing that an unborn fetus with a heartbeat is a natural
person who should be treated and afforded the rights of a born child); see also Complaint
at 27, SisterSong v. Kemp, (N.D. Ga. 2019) (No. 1:19-mi-99999-UJNA) (explaining that
the LIFE Act could force women to carry a child to term and parent this child against her
will).
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decision to raise their child as they wish.110 Family autonomy is a cherished
value in Georgia courts.'1 1 Applying the Georgia court's precedent
invalidating statutes covering familial decisions to the LIFE Act's provisions
encompassing the decision to become a parent, the act is unconstitutional
because it impinges upon the right of a family to make their own decisions.11 2
Choosing to have or not have a child is a parental decision in itself.' 3 If the
Georgia courts apply its case precedent of parental right to privacy to make
their own decisions on how to parent, then it would be unconstitutional to
prohibit a pregnant woman from making the decision of whether she is
willing and able to become a parent.1 14
B. Georgia Courts Should Evaluate the LIFE Act with its Own Right to
Privacy Deference Because Iowa, a State That Has Like Deference to the
Right to Privacy and Bodily Autonomy, Blocked an Iowa Fetal Heartbeat
Bill Identical to Georgia's LIFE Act Using Privacy Deference
Both Georgia and Iowa passed almost identical fetal heartbeat statutes
through their respective Republican-controlled state legislatures."'
Additionally, Georgia and Iowa courts afford great deference to the right to
make personal private decisions and maintain bodily autonomy and
integrity. 11 6 Iowa used its state constitution to strike down a heartbeat bill
110. See Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 772 (concluding that the parental right to control one's
child is protected by the Georgia constitutional right to privacy).
111. See Maddox v. Queen, 257 S.E.2d 918, 921 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (Deen, C.J.,
concurring) (enumerating that there is an established fundamental right to privacy for
those decisions surrounding the family unit); see also State v. Jackson, 496 S.E.2d 912,
916 (Ga. 1998) (affirming that there is a fundamental liberty interest in the privacy and
integrity of family units and that parents have supreme interests in the care of their
children).
112. Compare Jackson, 496 S.E.2d at 916 (establishing that there is a fundamental
interest of an individual making decisions for his or her own family), with Ga. H.B. 481
(disallowing women to decide when to begin a family or become a parent by prohibiting
abortion procedures after six weeks).
113. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972) (ascertaining that it would be
unreasonable for a state to implement a law that punishes a single person for sexual
intercourse by forcing that person to carry an unwanted child).
114. Compare Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, (Ga. 1995) (striking down a
grandparent visitation statute that infringed upon a parents right to make private familial
decisions), with Ga. H.B. 481 (excluding the right for a woman to choose when to
become a parent after a fetal heartbeat has been detected).
115. Compare Ga. H.B. 481 (prohibiting abortion procedures after a fetal heartbeat is
detected), with Senate File 359, Iowa Code §§ 146C.1-146C.2 (2018) (prohibiting
abortion procedures after a fetal heartbeat has been detected).
116. Compare Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 194-195 (1905)
264
THE GEORGIA LIFE ACT
using the constitutionally-protected fundamental rights to privacy, personal
decision-making, and bodily autonomy.'17 When Georgia, having similar
state constitutional precedent to Iowa, applies its like deference to the right
of privacy and bodily integrity, it will find the LIFE Act unconstitutional."
Bodily autonomy and dignity are central to the fundamental right to
privacy, and both Iowa and Georgia state constitutions and courts fiercely
guard it." 9 When finding the fetal heartbeat ban unconstitutional under the
Iowa state constitution, the Iowa Court referred to and used a similar court
decision on abortion laws as Georgia.1 2 0 If Georgia courts not only applied
their own jurisprudence surrounding the right to privacy to the LIFE Act, but
also considered other states that have like deference to the right to privacy
that found their own fetal heartbeat statutes unconstitutional, then the
Georgia Supreme Court would find that the LIFE Act is unconstitutional on
its face."'
The fundamental right to privacy protects profoundly personal decisions
regarding childbearing, family, and procreation. 122  Parenthood and the
(establishing that Georgians are entitled to the right to privacy), with Planned Parenthood
of the Heartland v. Reynolds, 915 N.W.2d 206, 235, 245 (Iowa 2018) (acknowledging
that the right to have an abortion is not deeply rooted in Iowa's state constitution, but the
right to make private personal decisions for one's own bodily integrity is fundamental),
and McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 832 (Iowa 2015) (establishing that
Iowans have the right to make personal private decisions about family, procreation, and
childrearing without unwarranted governmental intrusion).
117. Cf Reynolds, 915 N.W.2d at 236 (underscoring that Iowa constitutional
doctrines, such as the right to privacy and the right to make personal decisions, are not
static but recursive issues evolving with society).
118. See Pavesich, 122 Ga. at 194 (finding that the right to privacy is a fundamental
right derived from natural law principles and applies to all Georgia citizens).
119. Compare Reynolds, 915 N.W.2d at 237 (recognizing that the right to privacy and
the right to make one's own decisions without unwarranted governmental intrusion is
implicitly afforded to women when faced with the decision of whether to terminate a
pregnancy), with Pavesich, 122 Ga. at 194-195 (establishing that the right to privacy, the
right to uninterrupted quiet enjoyment of one's life, and the right to control one's own
body are immutable).
120. See Reynolds, 915 N.W. at 240 (finding that a woman's choice to terminate her
own pregnancy is an inherently intimate decision that may not be infringed upon
unnecessarily by the government).
121. Compare id. at 245 (invalidating the Iowa Fetal Heartbeat Act under the Iowa
state constitution and using other state decisions to proffer its conclusion), with Powell
v. State, 510 S.E. 2d 18, 23-24 (holding that private sexual intercourse that is consensual
is protected by the fundamental right to privacy and beyond the bounds of governmental
regulation), and The LIFE Act, H.B. 481, 154th Leg. (2019) (mandating that women may
not have an abortion after a fetal heartbeat is detected).
122. Compare McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 832 (Iowa 2015)
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decision to procreate is more than a biological function but also proffers
moral and legal responsibilities on potential parents to provide for his or her
child. 12 3 While privacy in familial decisions is not an absolute entitlement
to secrecy, it is more so the recognition that the state is incapable of assessing
whether each person who may seek an abortion is ready to assume the many
obligations and responsibilities that come with parenthood.1
2 4 The LIFE Act
rescinds a woman's right to make her own personal decision of deciding
when to become a parent. It also infringes upon the privacy tests from both
the Iowa decision to invalidate a fetal heartbeat statute and the like Georgia
jurisprudence protecting the right to privacy in familial and parenthood
matters, and thus should be found unconstitutional and invalid. 12 5
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
It is inherently dangerous to restrict abortion to the extent that it forces a
woman to maintain a pregnancy and carry a child to term. 126 Abortion is a
(holding that there are substantive due process protections including the right to privacy
surrounding procreation and family in Iowa), with Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769,
772 (Ga. 1995) (concluding that privacy interests enable parents to maintain a high
degree of discretion when making personal decisions for their families).
123. See Reynolds, 915 N.W.2d at 237 (finding that women have the right to privately
determine whether they are capable of making the life-altering decision to carry a child
to term and this decision can be made without state interference because the state is
unable to adequately assess if each individual woman is capable of becoming a parent);
Borgers v. Borgers, 820 S.E.2d 474, 482 (Ga. App. Ct. 2018) (Dillard, C.J. concurring)
(averring that the constitutional right to private familial relations is not provided by the
government but rather predates the government, and therefore, the government may not
intrude unduly in private familial matters without a compelling interest).
124. See Reynolds, 915 N.W.2d at 237 (averring that decisions of personal magnitude
like deciding whether to procreate and become a parent is a fundamentally private
decision that is best assessed by the person considering becoming a parent rather than
the state government).
125. See Ga. H.B. 481 (disallowing women to choose exactly when and in what
manner to begin a family if a fetal heartbeat is detectable); Reynolds, 915 N.W.2d at 234
(underscoring that privacy protections surrounding personal decisions about family,
procreation and child rearing are embodied in the Iowa state constitution); Brooks, 454
S.E.2d at 772 (stating that a parents' right to rear children without state interference is a
protected privacy interest that is protected by the Georgia state constitution).
126. See Complaint at 24-25, SisterSong v. Kemp, (N.D. Ga. 2019) (No. 1:19-mi-
99999-UNA) (advancing that a woman's risk of death associated with child birth is
fourteen times higher than that associated with a legal abortion); American Health
Rankings, United Health Found., Maternal Mortality (2019), https://www.americas
healthrankings.org/explore/health-of-women-and-children/measure/maternal
mortality (analyzing Center of Disease Control Data from 2011-2015 that demonstrates
the risk of maternal mortality and other pregnancy-related deaths is on the rise throughout
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safe medical procedure and carrying a child to term could pose greater risks
to a woman's health as the pregnancy progresses. 12 7 If the LIFE Act is found
to be constitutional, the sustainability of abortion clinics and providers in
Georgia would be jeopardized because of the reduction of women qualifying
for an abortion.1 2 8 Women who are unable to obtain an abortion, because
they surpassed the viability period, or left her rape or incest unreported,
would have to travel out of state. 129 If the LIFE Act is found constitutional
by the Georgia Court, women in Georgia will lose access to abortion
providers and will be unable to make the private decision of whether to have
a child.13 0
If the LIFE Act is found to be valid under the Georgia Constitution, the
Georgia state government must take affirmative steps to improve access to
healthcare for women and better its foster care system if pregnant women
must now carry their children to term.131 Women in Georgia face one of the
the United States); Ga. Dep't Pub. Health, Maternal Mortality Review Comm., Maternal
Mortality Report 2014 (March 2019) at 11, https://dph.georgia.gov/sites/
dph.georgia.gov/files/related files/sitepage/Georgia%2OMaternal%2oMortality%20R
eport%202014.pdf (identifying that Black women in Georgia are over three times more
likely to experience pregnancy-related complications that result in death).
127. See Alison Kodjak, Landmark Report Concludes Abortion in U.S. is Safe, NPR:
PUBLIC HEALTH (Mar. 16, 2018, 11:00 A.M.), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2018/03/1 6 /5 9 34 4 7 7 2 7/landmark-report-concludes-abortion-is-safe (profiling
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicines study on four methods of
abortion procedures and finding that abortion provided in the U.S. are safe and effective
with complications being a rare occurrence).
128. See Complaint at 33, Sistersong v. Kemp (explaining that those with clinics will
have to turn potential patients away if they do not comply fully with H.B. 481); Ben
Nadler & Sanya Mansoor, Georgia Governor Signs Restrictive 'Heartbeat' Abortion
Ban, AP NEWS (May 7, 2019) (underscoring that the few clinics that serve Georgian
women will be subject to closure and will further push licensed doctors who perform
abortion procedures from practicing in Georgia, leading to a potential decrease in overall
maternal care and increase in prenatal death).
129. See Gray Chapman, Who Stands to Lose the Most Under Georgia's Anti-
Abortion Bill?, ATLANTA MAGAZINE: NEWS & OPINION (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://www.atlantamagazine.com/news-culture-articles/who-stands-to-lose-the-most-
under-georgias-anti-abortion-bill/ (highlighting that women who live in rural areas may
lose the nearest abortion clinic, and thus, be forced to travel out of state to receive an
abortion procedure).
130. See e.g. Complaint at 7, 21, Sistersong v. Kemp (explaining that the LIFE Act
will divert the scarce resources abortion clinics have from providing abortions forcing
them to shut down and effectively eliminate Georgia women's ability to access abortion
in her state).
131. See Ariel Hart, Georgia Maternal Death Rate, Once Ranked Worst in U.S.,
Worse Now, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION: POLITICS (Sept. 28, 2018),
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highest risks of pregnancy-related deaths in the nation-over fifty-percent of
these deaths were preventable with adequate healthcare services. 32 The
LIFE Act provides a viable fetus to the same care as that of any other Georgia
citizen; thus, it requires that the fetus have access to adequate healthcare.133
Therefore, if Georgia requires a woman to carry a child to term upon viability




maternal deaths in the U.S. are highest in Georgia due to public health care providers
missing the warning signs of hemorrhage, hypertension, seizure and depression that can
be brought on during pregnancy); Georgia. 2016 Health of Women and Children Report,
AMERICAN HEALTH RANKINGS (2016), https://www.americashealthrankings.org/
learn/reports/2016-health-of-women-and-children-report/state-summaries-georgia
(finding that women's healthcare is ranked forty-fourth in the U.S. and infants'
healthcare is ranked forty-eighth in the U.S.); Mitch Jaugstetter, Georgia Faces Massive
Foster Care Crisis as Number ofKids Needing Homes Surges, THE TELEGRAPH (Jun. 29,
2018, 7:49 PM), https://www.macon.com/news/local/article 2 12960864.html (reporting
a sixty percent increase from 2014-2018 of children in foster care, and that the number
of foster homes statewide falls short of the growing need); Demographics of Children in
Foster Care, GEORGIA: DIVISION OF FAMILY & CHILDREN SERVICES (2019),
http://fostergeorgia.com/demographics-of-children-in-foster-care/ (noting that Black
children and White children make up the majority of the fifteen thousand children in
Georgia foster care as of May 2019).
132. See Georgia.: 2016 Health of Women and Children Report, AMERICAN HEALTH
RANKINGS (finding that Georgia women face the highest risk of pregnancy-related deaths
in the country and the state Department of Public Health should act to reduce this
statistic).
133. See Ga. H.B. 481 (proclaiming that an unborn fetus with a heartbeat is a natural
person who is guaranteed the rights of any 'born' natural person and is considered a part
of the Georgia population).
134. See Ga. H.B. 481 (granting the same rights and privileges to an unborn fetus as
any other infant outside of the womb and affords the fetus the right to be treated as an
individual and separate patient from its mother); The Editorial Board, Georgia Abortion
Bill Would Hurt State's Health Economy, THE EMORY WHEEL (Apr. 1, 2019),
https://emorywheel.com/georgia-abortion-bill-would-damage-states-health-economy/
(identifying that forty percent of counties in Georgia do not have access to pediatricians
in 2018 and almost half of counties did not have OB-GYNs. Further, Georgia's
healthcare crisis affects the most vulnerable: pregnant women, infants, and children);
Hart, Georgia Maternal Death Rate, Once Ranked Worst in U.S., Worse Now
(identifying that the lack of quality and competence demonstrated in healthcare for
pregnant in Georgia has led to many infant and maternal deaths that are otherwise
preventable. Calling for an increase in pregnancy-related healthcare spending to combat
the maternal mortality crisis in Georgia).
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CONCLUSION
The language of the LIFE Act reverses the plethora of privacy
jurisprudence that has been repeatedly afforded to Georgia citizens for over
a century. 35 The Act disallows Georgia women from keeping their intimate
decisions regarding when they wish to bear and parent a child private.' 3 6 It
further requires that a woman disclose her rape or incest before she is able to
receive an abortion, and failure to disclose the incident forces a woman to
carry the child to term against her will, destroying her ability to choose when
to become a parent. 3 7
The LIFE Act significantly limits Georgia women's right to privacy by
placing obstacles to accessing abortion procedures, and the narrow
exceptions the LIFE Act provides offer women little ability to circumvent
those obstacles." 8 Moreover, the LIFE Act violates the Georgia state
constitution and substantially infringes upon Georgia's fundamental right to
privacy.1 39
135. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 194 (1905); King v.
State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 495 (Ga. 2000) (establishing that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right derived from real property rights, but it is not without its limits if it
impinges upon First Amendment freedoms); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 23(1998)
(mandating that Georgia may not pass legislation that prohibits individuals from
participating in certain sexual acts when those acts are private and consensual); Borgers
v. Borgers, 820 S.E.2d 474, 480 (Ga. App. Ct. 2018) (explaining that parents maintain
sole discretion to raise their children and may not be subjected to undue governmental
intrusions).
136. See Ga. H.B. 481 (promulgating the rule that to get an abortion post-viability in
the case of rape or incest, a woman must officially file a report to the police before being
able to obtain an abortion procedure).
137. Compare Ga. H.B. 481 (mandating that women may obtain an abortion so long
as she reports her rape or incest to the police) with Borgers, 820 S.E.2d at 480 (allowing
parents to freely bring up their children without undue interference).
138. See Ga. H.B. 481 (mandating that an unborn fetus is considered a natural person
at the time of heartbeat detection and women are prohibited from obtaining an abortion
post detection unless they are able to qualify for one of the three exceptions).
139. See GA. CONST. OF 1983, Art. I, § I, Para. I. (enumerating that all Georgia citizens
may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law); Pavesich,
122 Ga. at 194-195 (declaring that there is a fundamental right to privacy that is derived
from natural law and entitles a person to quiet enjoyment of his or her life).
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